Hichilema’s Second Term Begins With Zambia’s Democracy Under Pressure

Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema has begun a second term in office, but the ceremony that should have marked another step in the country’s democratic journey instead exposed deep questions about the strength of its institutions.

According to Reuters, Hichilema was sworn in on Tuesday after winning the August 13 presidential election, securing a fresh mandate in a contest that election observers said was affected by serious irregularities. His main rival, Brian Mundubile, was not present to challenge the result. He was in prison, facing treason charges alongside his running mate, Makebi Zulu.

The contrast is striking.

Hichilema entered State House in 2021 promising to restore democratic credibility after accusing the previous government of manipulating elections and persecuting political opponents. Five years later, critics argue that some of the practices he once condemned have begun appearing under his administration.

The controversy surrounding the election goes beyond a disputed tally. International and domestic observers reported allegations of votes being added to Hichilema’s total, although they concluded that the changes did not alter the final outcome. In other words, the president may have won the election regardless, but the integrity of the process has become the more consequential issue.

That distinction matters.

Democracy is not simply about identifying the candidate who would have won under perfect conditions. It also depends on whether voters, opponents and institutions can trust the process that produces the winner.

The election period was marked by reports of the suspension of vote counting, the deployment of soldiers around polling and counting centers, arrests of opposition lawmakers and restrictions on access to the courts. Those developments have generated unusually strong concern in a country that has maintained competitive elections since the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s.

Historian Euston Chiputa captured the unease when he said: “Zambia’s democratic credentials are in peril. We have never experienced this kind of confusion.”

Perhaps the most troubling episode came as the legal window for challenging the election result was closing. Authorities reportedly restricted access to the courts before later stating that no complaint had been filed. That sequence raises a fundamental question: how meaningful is an electoral dispute mechanism if political actors cannot reliably access the institutions designed to adjudicate disputes?

The treason cases have added another layer to the crisis.

Mundubile, Zulu and about a dozen other opposition figures were detained after being accused of posing national security threats. Authorities have offered limited public evidence to substantiate the allegations, while a lawyer representing the accused has said they will defend themselves in court.

In Zambia, the danger is not merely reputational. Political systems develop precedents. Once governments discover that extraordinary measures can be used against opponents during politically sensitive periods, those measures can become easier for future administrations to deploy.

That is why Hichilema’s second term could ultimately be judged less by the inauguration itself than by what his government does next.

There is also an important economic contradiction unfolding. Financial markets have largely rewarded political continuity despite the democratic concerns. Zambia’s eurobonds gained 0.8% in dollar terms after the election, compared with 0.3% for the broader African market, while Citi upgraded the country’s international bonds and indicated plans to buy local government debt.

Investors have strong reasons to remain optimistic. Hichilema’s first term was defined by debt restructuring and efforts to stabilize an economy that had previously defaulted on its external debt. For investors, continuity can be attractive, particularly in a country whose copper reserves have made it strategically important.

But that confidence may be looking only at the immediate horizon.

As Christopher Vandome of Chatham House observed: “There might be a bit of short-sightedness here.” He argued that the developments do not represent the kind of institutional strengthening capable of producing durable investment conditions.

That warning deserves attention.

Zambia sits at the intersection of economics and geopolitics. Its copper and other mineral resources have made it increasingly important to both China and the United States, each of which congratulated Hichilema and sent representatives to his inauguration.

Yet mineral wealth and foreign investment cannot compensate indefinitely for weakened institutions. Investors may tolerate political uncertainty when returns are attractive, but sustainable investment ultimately depends on predictable courts, credible regulators, transparent elections and confidence that political power has limits.

Hichilema therefore begins his second term with an unusual burden. He has secured political continuity and retained investor confidence, but he must now demonstrate that his administration is not becoming another example of a government that values electoral victory more than the institutions that make elections meaningful.

In Zambia, the central question is no longer simply whether Hichilema won.

It is whether the country’s democracy will emerge from his second term stronger than he found it. democracy will emerge from his second term stronger than he found it.